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 The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
 
 
In the Matter of J. Michael Farrell, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-000293 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim
suspension pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). Respondent consents to the issuance of an order of interim 
suspension in this matter. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action regarding any trust, escrow, 
operating, and any other law office account(s) respondent may maintain at any 
bank or other financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any 
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instrument on the account(s).   
Within fifteen (15) days of this order, respondent shall serve and file the affidavit 
required by Rule 30, RLDE. Should respondent fail to timely file the required 
affidavit, respondent may be held in civil and/or criminal contempt of this Court as 
provided by Rule 30, RLDE. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
February 19, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Michael Heath Bolin, #341806, Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-000461 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
 
Carolyn C. Matthews, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. 5361 

Heard September 8, 2015 – Filed November 12, 2015 

Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled February 24, 2016 

REVERSED  
Trent Neuell Pruett, of Pruett Law Firm, of Gaffney, for 
Appellant. 
Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina 
Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.
GEATHERS, J.:  Appellant Michael Bolin (Inmate) challenges a decision of the 
South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC) upholding a determination of the 
South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) that Inmate must serve eighty-
five percent of his sentence before he is eligible for early release, discharge, or
community supervision.  Inmate argues that the eighty-five-percent requirement of 
14 

 section 24-13-150 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015) does not apply to any 
of the offenses to which he pled guilty because they are not considered "no-parole 
offenses." We reverse the ALC's decision.   
 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 On May 15, 2012, Inmate pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, 
second offense (possession), possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute, second offense (intent to distribute), conspiracy to manufacture 
methamphetamine, second offense (conspiracy), and unlawful possession of a 
pistol. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on each methamphetamine 
offense and one year of imprisonment for the weapon offense, to run concurrently.   
 
 Curiously, after Inmate began serving his sentence, DOC informed him that 
he was eligible for parole on his conspiracy conviction and intent to distribute 
conviction under section 44-53-375(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015) 
but if he was not granted parole, these offenses would thereafter be treated as no-
parole offenses under section 24-13-100 of the South Carolina Code (2007) and 
section 24-13-150 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015).1  Section 24-13-150 
requires an inmate convicted of a no-parole offense to serve at least eighty-five 
percent of his sentence before he is eligible for early release, discharge, or 
community supervision.2  Section 24-13-100 defines the term "no-parole offense," 
in pertinent part, as "a class A, B, or C felony."3  Whether a felony is a Class A, B, 
or C felony depends on the maximum sentence for the felony—a Class A felony is 
a felony punishable by not more than thirty years, a Class B felony is a felony 
 
                                        
 
 
 
1 Inmate committed these offenses on April 7, 2011, and July 12, 2011,
respectively.  Both parties agree that Inmate's other offenses, simple possession of 
methamphetamine, second offense, and possession of a pistol, are not subject to the 
eighty-five-percent requirement.
2 Section 24-13-150(A) states, in pertinent part, "Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, . . . an inmate convicted of a 'no[-]parole offense' . . . is not 
eligible for early release, discharge, or community supervision . . . until the inmate 
has served at least eighty-five percent of the actual term of imprisonment 
imposed."
3 Section 24-13-100 was enacted in 1995. See Act No. 83, 1995 S.C. Acts 551.  
15 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
punishable by not more than twenty-five years, and a Class C felony is a felony 
punishable by not more than twenty years.  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-20 (2003).4 
Subsequently, Inmate filed a Step 1 grievance form with DOC, stating that 
DOC incorrectly calculated his projected release date by requiring him to serve 
eighty-five percent of his sentence and, thus, treating his conspiracy and intent to 
distribute offenses as no-parole offenses under section 24-13-100.  Inmate asserted 
that the amended provisions of section 44-53-375(B) preclude DOC from treating 
these offenses as no-parole offenses.5  After this grievance was denied, Inmate
filed a Step 2 grievance form, which was also denied.   
Inmate appealed DOC's determination to the ALC, and the ALC upheld the 
determination.  This appeal followed. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the ALC err in concluding that Inmate must serve at least eighty-five 
percent of his sentence before he is eligible for early release, discharge, or 
community supervision? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 1-23-610(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015) sets forth the 
standard of review when this court is sitting in review of a decision by the ALC on
an appeal from an administrative agency.  Specifically, section 1-23-610(B) allows 
this court to reverse the ALC's decision if it violates a constitutional or statutory 
provision or is affected by any other error of law.6  Here, the sole issue on review 
4 See also S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-30 (2003) ("All criminal offenses created by 
statute after July 1, 1993, must be classified according to the maximum term of 
imprisonment provided in the statute and pursuant to Sections 16-1-10 and 16-1-
20, except as provided in Section 16-1-10(D)."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-10(D) 
(Supp. 2015) (listing offenses that are exempt from classification). 
5 Inmate also complained that DOC incorrectly classified his conspiracy offense as 
a violent offense.  DOC ultimately resolved this particular part of Inmate's
grievance in his favor.
6 S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B)(a), (d) (Supp. 2015). 
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involves a question of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law "subject 
to de novo review." Barton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob. Parole & Pardon Servs., 404 
S.C. 395, 414, 745 S.E.2d 110, 120 (2013).   
Further, while the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its 
administration "will be accorded the most respectful consideration," an agency's 
interpretation "affords no basis for the perpetuation of a patently erroneous 
application of the statute."  State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 351, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575-
76 (2010) (quotation marks omitted).   
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Inmate contends that the eighty-five-percent requirement of section 24-13-
150 does not apply to his conspiracy and intent to distribute convictions because 
they are no longer considered no-parole offenses by virtue of the 2010 amendment
to section 44-53-375(B), which addresses the possession, manufacture, or 
trafficking of methamphetamine.  We agree. 
As previously stated, section 24-13-150 requires an inmate who has been 
convicted of a no-parole offense to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before 
he is eligible for "early release, discharge, or community supervision."7  In addition 
7 In contrast, most inmates who have been convicted of a parolable, nonviolent 
offense are required to serve only twenty-five percent of their sentences before 
becoming eligible for parole.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-610 (2007) (requiring a 
prisoner convicted of a parolable, nonviolent offense to serve "at least one-fourth
of the term of a sentence" before the Parole Board "may . . . parole" the prisoner). 
Of course, an inmate's eligibility for parole merely gives the Parole Board the 
authority to grant parole—the decision to grant or deny parole is within the Parole
Board's discretion, as indicated by the legislature's use of the word "may" in
section 24-21-610. See Robertson v. State, 276 S.C. 356, 358, 278 S.E.2d 770, 771 
(1981) ("Ordinarily, 'may' signifies permission and generally means the action 
spoken of is optional or discretionary."). Notably, if the Parole Board denies 
parole to an eligible inmate, it must review the inmate's case on a yearly basis.  See
S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-620 (2007) ("Upon an affirmative determination, the 
prisoner must be granted a provisional parole or parole.  Upon a negative 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
to the eighty-five-percent requirement, at least three additional consequences
attach to a conviction for an offense categorized as "no-parole": (1) no-parole 
offenders are given significantly less credits for good conduct, work, or education
than other offenders, (2) no-parole offenders are required to participate in a 
community supervision program before their sentences are considered completed,
and (3) no-parole offenders are required to serve eighty percent of their sentences
before they are eligible for work release.8 
Prior to June 2, 2010, conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, second 
offense, and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, second offense,
were in fact considered no-parole offenses.  In other words, section 44-53-375(B) 
imposed a maximum sentence of thirty years for a second offense of possession 
with intent to distribute methamphetamine or conspiracy to manufacture 
methamphetamine.  See Act No. 127, 2005 S.C. Acts 1497 (increasing the 
maximum sentence from twenty-five to thirty years).  Accordingly, these offenses 
were considered Class A felonies and, thus, no-parole offenses.  See S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-1-20(A) (2003) (stating that a person convicted of a Class A felony must
be imprisoned for "not more than thirty years"); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-100 
(2007) (including a Class A felony in the definition of no-parole offense).   
However, on June 2, 2010, the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing 
Reform Act of 2010 (the Act) became effective.  While the Act did not amend the 
definition of the term "no-parole offense" in section 24-13-100 or decrease the 
maximum sentence for a second offense of possession with intent to distribute 
determination, the prisoner's case shall be reviewed every twelve months thereafter 
for the purpose of such determination.").   
8 See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-125(A) (Supp. 2015) (requiring no-parole offenders 
to serve eighty percent of their sentences before becoming eligible for work 
release); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210(A), (B) (Supp. 2015) (allowing twenty days 
of good conduct credits for each month served for inmates convicted of parolable
offenses versus three days for each month served for no-parole offenders); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 24-13-230(A), (B) (Supp. 2015) (allowing zero to one day of work or 
education credit for every two days of employment or enrollment for inmates
convicted of parolable offenses versus six days for every month of employment or 
enrollment for no-parole offenders); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-560(A) (2007) 
(requiring no-parole offenders to participate in a community supervision program).
18 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
methamphetamine or conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, it added the 
following language to section 44-53-375(B): "Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, a person convicted and sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a 
first offense or second offense may have the sentence suspended and probation 
granted, and is eligible for parole, supervised furlough, community supervision, 
work release, work credits, education credits, and good conduct credits."  2010 Act 
No. 273, § 38 (emphases added).  Similar language was added to subsection (A) of 
section 44-53-375 and various provisions in section 44-53-370 covering controlled 
substances. 
The legislature's use of the phrase "Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law," in the amendments to sections 44-53-375 and -370 expresses its intent to
repeal section 24-13-100 to the extent it conflicts with amended sections 44-53-375 
and -370. See Stone v. State, 313 S.C. 533, 535, 443 S.E.2d 544, 545 (1994) 
(holding that when two statutes "are in conflict, the more recent and specific statute 
should prevail so as to repeal the earlier, general statute"); Hair v. State, 305 S.C. 
77, 79, 406 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1991) ("The law clearly provides that if two statutes 
are in conflict, the latest statute passed should prevail so as to repeal the earlier 
statute to the extent of the repugnancy."); Strickland v. State, 276 S.C. 17, 19, 274 
S.E.2d 430, 432 (1981) ("[S]tatutes of a specific nature are not to be considered as
repealed in whole or in part by a later general statute unless there is a direct
reference to the former statute or the intent of the legislature to do so is explicitly 
implied therein." (emphases added)).  Even if the language of section 24-13-100 
could be considered more specific than the amendment to section 44-53-375(B),
the intent to repeal section 24-13-100 to the extent it conflicts with the 
amendments to sections 44-53-370 and -375 is "explicitly implied" in the language 
of the amendments stating, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law."  See
Strickland, 276 S.C. at 19, 274 S.E.2d at 432 ("[S]tatutes of a specific nature are 
not to be considered as repealed in whole or in part by a later general statute unless
there is a direct reference to the former statute or the intent of the legislature to do 
so is explicitly implied therein." (emphases added)).  Without this implicit repeal,
the amendments themselves would be meaningless.  See State v. Long, 363 S.C. 
360, 364, 610 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2005) ("The legislature is presumed to intend that 
its statutes accomplish something."). 
DOC admits that amended section 44-53-375(B) allows a person convicted 
of a second offense to be eligible for parole.  However, according to DOC, a 
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second offense under section 44-53-375(B) is still considered a no-parole offense 
unless the inmate is granted parole. During oral arguments, DOC asserted that the 
terms "parole eligible" and "no-parole offense" are defined differently. DOC 
argued, "a no-parole offense, as defined in [section] 24-13-100, is not defined by 
whether or not someone is eligible for parole."  DOC further argued that the 
determination of parole eligibility and the application of good conduct, work or 
education credits to a sentence for a no-parole offense are two separate "parallel 
courses and both of those interpretations of [the] statutes do not conflict with one
another." We disagree. 
It is without doubt that the statutory definition for the term "no-parole 
offense" in section 24-13-100, i.e., "a class A, B, or C felony . . . ," simply 
describes the types of offenses for which the offender is not eligible for parole.9 
This interpretation is consistent with provisions in related statutes stating that a no-
parole offender is not eligible for parole.10  Thus, it is unreasonable to characterize 
an offense for which the offender is eligible for parole as a no-parole offense
pursuant to section 24-13-100, even if the maximum sentence for the offense 
places it within a classification encompassed by section 24-13-100.11  This is the 
9 See Sweat, 386 S.C. at 350, 688 S.E.2d at 575 ("The Court should give words 
their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to 
limit or expand the statute's operation." (quotation marks omitted)); id. ("A statute
as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant 
with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers." (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
10 See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-30(A) (2007) ("A person who commits a 'no[-
]parole offense' as defined in Section 24-13-100 on or after the effective date of 
this section is not eligible for parole consideration . . . ."); § 24-21-30(B) ("Nothing 
in this subsection may be construed to allow any person who commits a 'no[-
]parole offense' as defined in Section 24-13-100 on or after the effective date of 
this section to be eligible for parole."); Beaufort Cnty. v. S.C. State Election 
Comm'n, 395 S.C. 366, 371, 718 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2011) ("[I]t is well settled that 
statutes dealing with the same subject matter are in pari materia and must be 
construed together, if possible, to produce a single, harmonious result."). 
11 See Sweat, 386 S.C. at 350, 688 S.E.2d at 575 ("All rules of statutory 
construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it 
can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be 
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situation with a second offense under amended section 44-53-375(B), which still 
carries a maximum sentence of thirty years, rendering the offense a class A felony. 
Therefore, the definition of no-parole offense in section 24-13-100 conflicts with 
the legislative intent of the Act to exempt a second offense under section 44-53-
375(B) from all the consequences of a no-parole offense.   
In addition to the plain language of the amendment itself, legislative intent is 
expressly stated in Section I of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part,   
It is the intent of the General Assembly to preserve 
public safety, reduce crime, and use correctional 
resources most effectively. Currently, the South Carolina 
correctional system incarcerates people whose time in
prison does not result in improved behavior and who 
often return to South Carolina communities and commit 
new crimes, or are returned to prison for violations of 
supervision requirements.  It is, therefore, the purpose of
this act to reduce recidivism, provide fair and effective 
sentencing options, employ evidence-based practices for 
smarter use of correctional funding, and improve public 
safety. 
2010 Act No. 273, § 1 (emphases added).  Hence, one of the Act's objectives is to 
conserve taxpayer dollars by allowing earlier release dates for inmates convicted of 
less serious offenses. 
construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute." (quotation marks 
omitted)); id. ("A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair
interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers."); 
id. at 351, 688 S.E.2d at 575 ("Courts will reject a statutory interpretation which 
would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the 
Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention."); State v. Johnson, 396 
S.C. 182, 188, 720 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In interpreting a statute, the 
court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and will not resort to 
forced construction that would limit or expand the statute.").
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DOC ignores the purpose of the Act and argues that amended section 44-53-
375 does not conflict with sections 24-13-100 and -150 because offenders can be 
afforded each item listed in the amendment, i.e., parole, supervised furlough, 
community supervision, work release, work credits, education credits, and good 
conduct credits, without altering an eighty-five-percent service requirement for 
those not granted parole. DOC explains that none of the items in this list are 
incompatible with a requirement that an offender not granted parole serve eighty-
five percent of his sentence. In support of this argument, DOC cites the following 
provisions:  S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210(B) (Supp. 2015) (providing for good 
conduct credits at the rate of three days for each month served for no-parole 
offenders subject to the eighty-five-percent requirement); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-
230(B) (Supp. 2015) (providing for work or education credits at the rate of six days 
for every month of employment or enrollment for no-parole offenders); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 24-21-560(A) (2007) (requiring no-parole offenders to participate in a 
community supervision program).   
However, as we previously indicated, supra, there is a stark contrast
between the credits allowed for inmates convicted of parolable offenses and the 
credits allowed for no-parole offenders.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210(A), (B) 
(Supp. 2015) (allowing twenty days of good conduct credits for each month served
for inmates convicted of parolable offenses versus three days for each month 
served for no-parole offenders); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-230(A), (B) (Supp. 2015) 
(allowing zero to one day of work or education credit for every two days of 
employment or enrollment for inmates convicted of parolable offenses versus six 
days for every month of employment or enrollment for no-parole offenders).      
Further, DOC has not explained away the following language from the 
amendment: "[A] person convicted and sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a 
first offense or second offense may have the sentence suspended and probation 
granted . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) (Supp. 2015) The incongruity 
between this express allowance and the eighty-five-percent requirement that 
applies to no-parole offenses makes it unlikely that the legislature intended for this
requirement to apply to the amended provisions of section 44-53-375(B).   
DOC also argues that Inmate's interpretation of the amendment would render 
the language referencing community supervision meaningless because "only
offenders serving sentences for 'no[-]parole offenses' are required to participate in
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community supervision."  That may have been true before the amendments to 
sections 44-53-370 and -375 were enacted, but these amendments now expressly 
allow offenders to participate in community supervision as an alternative to the use 
of taxpayer funds to house them in prison.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) 
(Supp. 2015) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person convicted and 
sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a first offense or second offense . . . is 
eligible for . . . community supervision . . . ."); 2010 Act No. 273, § 1 ("It is, 
therefore, the purpose of this act to reduce recidivism, provide fair and effective 
sentencing options, employ evidence-based practices for smarter use of
correctional funding, and improve public safety." (emphasis added)).  
Based on the foregoing, we hold that a second offense under section 44-53-
375(B) is no longer a no-parole offense.  See Sweat, 386 S.C. at 350, 688 S.E.2d at 
575 ("All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the 
legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language 
used, and that language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the 
statute." (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the ALC erred in rejecting 
Inmate's interpretation of the statutes in question.
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we reverse the ALC's decision.    
REVERSED. 
SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
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SHORT, J.:  Marc Palmer appeals his convictions for murder and possession of a 
weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  He argues the trial court erred 
in: (1) granting the State's Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), motion; (2) 
denying his motion for a mistrial and a motion for a new trial; (3) denying his 
motion for a speedy trial; (4) admitting his statement to law enforcement after he 
invoked his right to counsel; and (5) sentencing him for possession of a weapon 
during the commission of a violent crime after sentencing him to life imprisonment 
without parole for murder. We affirm and vacate in part. 
FACTS
On October 28, 2010, at about 10:30 p.m., Therris Keels (Victim) was shot and 
killed. Victim was shot twice: once in the head and once in the abdomen.
There were several witnesses to the shooting.  Maurice Smith saw Palmer point a 
gun at Victim.  Victim put his hands up as if to let Palmer know he did not have a 
gun. Palmer shot Victim two times and walked away.  He then turned around, shot
Victim another time as he lay on the ground, and ran off.  Smith then heard the 
familiar squealing sound of Palmer's car.   
Brittany Croskey also observed the shooting.  She saw someone pacing back and 
forth along the road and recognized the distinctive walk as belonging to Palmer.  
She saw Victim hold his hands up and heard two gun shots.  She then saw the 
person who was pacing walk over to Victim, who was on the ground, and shoot 
him again. 
Levar Wesley Walker saw a man walk towards Victim, and Victim held his hands 
out. The man then reached in his pants, pulled out a gun, and shot Victim two 
times. He testified the man had a "ponytail puffed up with hair."  Walker said that 
prior to the shooting, he had seen Palmer wear his hair in a "ponytail puffed out."   
Witnesses also testified that Victim and Palmer had a history of fighting.  Smith 
testified he saw Palmer and Victim in a physical fight prior to the night Victim was 
shot, and Palmer told Victim it "wasn't over."  Smith also saw Palmer fighting a 
few weeks prior to the shooting with another man, Dominique McBride, and 
during the fight, Palmer "dropped" a gun.  
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Detrel Matthews likewise testified he saw Palmer and Victim in an argument prior 
to the shooting. Matthews also saw Palmer fight McBride a few weeks prior to the 
shooting and saw what appeared to be a gun fall out of Palmer's waistband.  
Investigator Wayne McFadden with the Williamsburg County Sheriff's Office 
testified Matthews told him his brother returned a .45 caliber handgun to Palmer 
before the shooting.
Investigator McFadden obtained surveillance video from a business close to the 
shooting, and observed a greenish-colored Neon, missing a hubcap on the front 
driver's-side tire, traveling down the road at about the same time the 9-1-1 call was 
received. Smith testified Palmer drove a greenish-blueish Neon.  Palmer later 
admitted it was his car on the video.  Police recovered three .45-caliber shell 
casings from the scene of the shooting. 
John Creech, a senior agent with the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division 
(SLED), interviewed Palmer on October 29, 2010, at 4:40 p.m.  He gave Palmer 
his Miranda1 rights, and Palmer waived them. Palmer told the police he and 
Victim had an argument earlier on the day of the shooting.  He said he left the club 
that night at about 10:10 p.m. and drove until he ran out of gas.  He then called a 
person named "Smoke" for a ride home at 3:00 a.m.  Creech testified no one could 
account for Palmer's whereabouts from 10:10 p.m. until 3:00 a.m.  Investigator 
McFadden viewed video surveillance at a gas station where Palmer told police he 
was during the time of the shooting, but he did not see Palmer's vehicle on the 
footage. The police did not find any gunshot residue or blood on Palmer's clothes.  
No fingerprints were found on the shell casings or a soda can found at the scene of 
the shooting. The only DNA recovered that could be analyzed belonged to Victim.  
A trial was held March 11-14, 2013. The jury found Palmer guilty of murder and 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  Palmer moved 
for a new trial for the same reasons asserted in his motion for directed verdict, 
motion for mistrial, motion in limine, and a speedy trial.  The court denied the 
motion.  The court sentenced him to life in prison for murder, plus five years for 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, to be served 
consecutively. This appeal followed.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only, and is bound by the 
trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009).  Thus, on review, the 
court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Id.  An 
abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is unsupported by the evidence 
or controlled by an error of law.  State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732 S.E.2d 880, 
884 (2012). The appellate court "does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own 
view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines whether the trial 
court's ruling is supported by any evidence."  Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508, 682 
S.E.2d at 822. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Preemptory Challenges 
Palmer argues the trial court erred in granting the State's Batson v. Kentucky
motion.  We disagree. 
In Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, the Supreme Court of the United States held the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States forbids a prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of 
their race or on the assumption that African American jurors as a group will be 
unable to impartially consider the State's case against an African American 
defendant. In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992), the Supreme Court 
held the Constitution also prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in
purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.  
Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States prohibits the striking of a potential juror based on 
race or gender. State v. Evins, 373 S.C. 404, 415, 645 S.E.2d 904, 909 (2007).  
When one party strikes a member of a cognizable racial group or gender, the trial 
court must hold a Batson hearing if the opposing party requests one. State v. 
Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 629, 515 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1999). 
In State v. Giles, our supreme court explained the proper procedure for a Batson
hearing:
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First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must 
make a prima facie showing that the challenge was based 
on race. If a sufficient showing is made, the trial court 
will move to the second step in the process, which 
requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a race 
neutral explanation for the challenge. If the trial court 
finds that burden has been met, the process will proceed 
to the third step, at which point the trial court must 
determine whether the opponent of the challenge has 
proved purposeful discrimination. 
407 S.C. 14, 18, 754 S.E.2d 261, 263 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
"While '[m]erely denying a discriminatory motive' is insufficient, the proponent of 
the strike need only present race or gender neutral reasons." State v. Casey, 325 
S.C. 447, 451-52, 481 S.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Watts, 
320 S.C. 377, 380, 465 S.E.2d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1995)).  "[A] 'legitimate reason'
is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection."  
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). The explanation "need not be 
persuasive, or even plausible, but it must be clear and reasonably specific such that 
the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext 
in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess the plausibility of 
the reason in light of all the evidence with a bearing on it."  Giles, 407 S.C. at 21-
22, 754 S.E.2d at 265.  "The burden of persuading the court that a Batson violation 
has occurred remains at all times on the opponent of the strike."  Evins, 373 S.C. at 
415, 645 S.E.2d at 909. The opponent of the strike is required show the race-
neutral or gender-neutral explanation was mere pretext, which generally is 
established by showing the party did not strike a similarly-situated member of 
another race or gender.  Haigler, 334 S.C. at 629, 515 S.E.2d at 91. 
"Whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the 
totality of the facts and circumstances in the record."  Edwards, 384 S.C. at 509, 
682 S.E.2d at 822. "Under some circumstances, the race-neutral explanation given 
by the proponent may be so fundamentally implausible that the [trial court] may 
determine . . . the explanation was mere pretext even without a showing of 
disparate treatment." Haigler, 334 S.C. at 629, 515 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Payton v. 
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Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 55, 495 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1998)).  "The trial [court's] findings 
of purposeful discrimination rest largely on [its] evaluation of demeanor and 
credibility." Edwards, 384 S.C. at 509, 682 S.E.2d at 823. "Often the demeanor of 
the challenged attorney will be the best and only evidence of discrimination, and 
an 'evaluation of the [attorney's] mind [based on demeanor and credibility] lies 
peculiarly within a trial [court's] province.'" Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 
500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991)). The [trial court's] findings regarding purposeful 
discrimination are given great deference and will not be set aside by this court 
unless clearly erroneous.  Evins, 373 S.C. at 416, 645 S.E.2d at 909-10. "This 
standard of review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated 
procedure for a Batson hearing." State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 312, 631 S.E.2d 
294, 297 (Ct. App. 2006). "[W]here the assignment of error is the failure to follow 
the Batson hearing procedure, we must answer a question of law.  When a question 
of law is presented, our standard of review is plenary." Id. at 312-13, 631 S.E.2d at 
297. 
"If a trial court improperly grants the State's Batson motion, but none of the 
disputed jurors serve on the jury, any error in improperly quashing the jury is 
harmless because a defendant is not entitled to the jury of her choice."  Edwards, 
384 S.C. at 509, 682 S.E.2d at 823 (citing State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106, 114, 631 
S.E.2d 244, 248 (2006)). "However, if one of the disputed jurors is seated on the 
jury, then the erroneous Batson ruling has tainted the jury and prejudice is 
presumed in such cases 'because there is no way to determine with any degree of 
certainty whether a defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was 
abridged.'" Id. (quoting Rayfield, 369 at 114, 631 S.E.2d at 248).  If this occurs, 
the proper remedy in such cases is the granting of a new trial.  Id.
During jury selection, Palmer exercised peremptory strikes on white and black 
jurors. He struck nine white jurors and two black jurors.  The State requested a 
Batson hearing, asserting Palmer's strikes were not race neutral. 
Palmer testified as to the following reasons for striking each white juror: 
	 Juror 46 had employment with Williamsburg County, and he strikes county 
employees when the Sheriff's Office makes a case for the county.   
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	 Juror 178 was employed by the South Carolina Department of Natural 

Resources and potentially had a law enforcement connection and was 

sympathetic to law enforcement.   

	 Juror 31 was employed by the Department of Social Services (DSS) and 
anyone involved in DSS may potentially be sympathetic to law enforcement.  
	 Juror 97 was employed by the United States Postal Service, and based on his 
employment, he may have sympathies for law enforcement.  
	 Juror 136 was a Hemingway resident and worked for the steel company in 
the electrician field. Palmer explained there were technical issues involving 
Palmer's car, and the juror could sway other jurors based on his training.
	 Juror 173 was a plant supervisor, and given his supervisory capacity, he was 
potentially unsympathetic to Palmer.   
	 Juror 7's daughter was involved in a criminal case as a victim or a witness. 
	 Juror 5's wife was a registered nurse in the operating room, and operating 
room nurses have relationships with law enforcement and are sympathetic 
with law enforcement. 
	 Juror 29 was a paramedic, and paramedics have a close relationship with law 
enforcement. 
In response, the State asserted Palmer testified he struck white jurors because they 
were government employees.  However, Palmer seated Juror 27, a black male, who 
was retired from the County Transit Authority and would be no different from
Juror 97, who was also a government employee.  Jurors 27, 61, and 87 were from
Hemingway, and Palmer struck Juror 136 for being from Hemingway.  Palmer also 
seated Juror 12, a black female, who worked at the Georgetown Hospital as a 
certified nursing assistant, and her brother was a witness in the case.  The State 
asserted she was no different from Juror 29, who was a paramedic, and Juror 5, 
whose wife was a nurse.  Therefore, the State argued some of the reasons advanced 
by Palmer were pretextual because he seated similarly-situated black jurors.  
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Palmer responded his concern with Juror 136 was more that he was a mechanic 
than that he was from Hemingway.  As to the bus driver who was not struck, 
Palmer asserted she would not have similar leanings supporting law enforcement 
as the other government employees because they are employed within the 
government walls.  The court stated it was not convinced the answers were race 
neutral; therefore, it granted the State's Batson motion and redrew the jury. 
We acknowledge that Palmer's stated concerns that Jurors 46, 178, 31, and 97 were 
government employees who interacted regularly with law enforcement were race 
neutral reasons to strike.  Id. at 510, 682 S.E.2d at 823 (stating petitioners' stated 
concern that juror 131 was a state employee who interacted regularly with law 
enforcement was a race neutral reason to strike).  Palmer's concerns about Jurors 
136, 173, and 29's jobs also were race-neutral reasons to strike.  Id. ("Employment 
is a well-understood and recognized consideration in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges."); State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 65, 512 S.E.2d 500, 504 (1999) (holding 
place of employment is a race-neutral reason for a strike); State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 
114, 125, 470 S.E.2d 366, 372 (1996) (finding type of employment is a race-
neutral reason for a strike). However, the State demonstrated the explanations 
were pretextual by showing Palmer did not strike similarly-situated members of 
another race. See Haigler, 334 S.C. at 629, 515 S.E.2d at 91 (providing an 
opponent of a strike must show the race or gender-neutral explanation was mere 
pretext, which generally is established by showing the party did not strike a 
similarly-situated member of another race or gender).  Therefore, we find the trial 
court did not err in granting the State's Batson motion. 
II. Motions for Mistrial and New Trial 
Palmer argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and a 
motion for a new trial.  We disagree. 
"The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." State v. Harris, 382 S.C. 107, 117, 674 S.E.2d 532, 537 (Ct. App. 2009).  
"The trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion amounting to an error of law."  Id.  "A mistrial should only be granted 
when absolutely necessary, and a defendant must show both error and resulting 
prejudice in order to be entitled to a mistrial."  Id.  "The granting of a motion for a 
mistrial is an extreme measure that should only be taken if an incident is so 
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grievous that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way."  Id.  The 
defendant must show error and resulting prejudice to receive a mistrial.  State v. 
Council, 335 S.C. 1, 13, 515 S.E.2d 508, 514 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1050 
(1999).
During trial, a witness was asked if he took a polygraph test.  Palmer objected to 
the question, and the court overruled the objection.  Palmer moved for a mistrial 
based upon the introduction of the fact that the witness took a polygraph test.  The 
State responded that the reference to the polygraph was from a witness and not 
Palmer; thus, the motion for mistrial was improper and the witness' testimony that 
he took a polygraph test was relevant evidence.  The court denied the motion for 
mistrial.
After the jury reached its verdict, Palmer moved for a new trial based upon the 
admission of the fact that the witness took a polygraph test.  Palmer asserted the 
jury could infer the witness passed the polygraph and was no longer a suspect, and 
Palmer did not take a polygraph test because he could not pass one.  He also 
asserted it was improper burden shifting.  The State again asserted the reference to 
the polygraph was from a witness and not Palmer.  The court denied Palmer's
motion for a new trial: 
I find that it certainly appeared that he received a fair 
trial. I am going to deny your motion for a new trial and 
I don't believe that, by the witness concerning the 
polygraph and quite frankly I think that was one of your 
weaknesses that was called at that time.  I am going to 
deny . . . . 
Before our supreme court's decision in Council, the law of South Carolina was that 
evidence of polygraph examinations was generally inadmissible.  See State v. 
Johnson, 334 S.C. 78, 90, 512 S.E.2d 795, 801 (1999) ("Evidence regarding the 
results of a polygraph test or the defendant's willingness or refusal to submit to one 
is inadmissible."); State v. Wright, 322 S.C. 253, 255, 471 S.E.2d 700, 701 (1996) 
("Generally, the results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible because the 
reliability of the polygraph is questionable.").  "Although [the court] in Council
declined to recognize a per se rule against the admission of polygraph evidence, it
indicated that the 'admissibility of this type of scientific evidence should be 
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analyzed under Rules 702 and 403, SCRE and the [State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 
259 S.E.2d 120 (1979)] factors.'"  Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 533, 657 S.E.2d 
771, 778 (2008) (quoting Council, 335 S.C. at 24, 515 S.E.2d at 520). Rule 403, 
SCRE, provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  "The general rule is that 
no mention of a polygraph test should be placed before the jury.  It is thus 
incumbent upon the trial [court] to ensure that should such a reference be made, no 
improper inference be drawn therefrom."  State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11, 654 
S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007). 
The State argues the question was intended solely to show the witness had 
cooperated with law enforcement during the investigation.  The State asserts that 
no mention of the results of the polygraph were made and there was no mention of 
whether Palmer took or was offered a polygraph test.  The State asserts Palmer 
suffered no prejudice from the evidence even if the trial court erred in allowing the 
question because the results of the witness' polygraph were not discussed at trial.  
Furthermore, the one question during the witness' cross-examination was the only 
reference to a polygraph during Palmer's trial. 
To receive a mistrial, Palmer was required to show error and resulting prejudice.  
See Council, 335 S.C. at 13, 515 S.E.2d at 514.  We find the trial court's decision 
not to grant a mistrial is supported by the evidence.  First, the evidence admitted 
was simply that the witness took a polygraph test.  The results of this test were not 
indicated at trial and are not mentioned anywhere in the record.  While the jury 
could have inferred, as claimed by Palmer, that the witness passed the polygraph 
test and was no longer a suspect, and Palmer did not take a polygraph test because 
he could not pass one, an equally plausible inference is that Palmer was not asked 
to take a polygraph because there was no mention of Palmer being asked to take 
one. Because there was no evidence regarding the results of the witness' polygraph 
test, Palmer failed to meet his burden of establishing the prejudicial impact of this 
evidence. Further, the one reference to the witness taking a polygraph test was an 
isolated comment. Therefore, we find the trial court did not err in denying his 
motions.
III. Speedy Trial 
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Palmer argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a speedy trial.  We 
disagree. 
A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. 
VI; S.C. Const. art. I, § 14. "This right 'is designed to minimize the possibility of 
lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless 
substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, 
and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of 
unresolved criminal charges.'" State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 548-49, 647 S.E.2d 
144, 155 (2007) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)). A 
"'speedy trial does not mean an immediate one; it does not imply undue haste, for 
the [S]tate, too, is entitled to a reasonable time in which to prepare its case; it 
simply means a trial without unreasonable and unnecessary delay.'" State v. 
Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 441, 735 S.E.2d 471, 481-82 (2012) (quoting Wheeler v. 
State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966)).  "There is no universal test 
to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated."  
Evans, 386 S.C. at 423, 688 S.E.2d at 586. 
When determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his or her right to a 
speedy trial, this court should consider four factors: (1) length of the delay; (2) 
reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the 
defendant. State v. Brazell, 325 S.C. 65, 75, 480 S.E.2d 64, 70 (1997) (citing 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). These four factors are related and 
must be considered together with any other relevant circumstances.  Barker, 407 
U.S. at 533. "Accordingly, the determination that a defendant has been deprived of 
this right is not based on the passage of a specific period of time, but instead is 
analyzed in terms of the circumstances of each case, balancing the conduct of the 
prosecution and the defense." Pittman, 373 S.C. at 549, 647 S.E.2d at 155. 
However, in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992), the United 
States Supreme Court suggested in dicta that a delay of more than a year is 
"presumptively prejudicial."  Also, in State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104, 108, 240 
S.E.2d 651, 653 (1978), our supreme court found a two-year-and-four-month delay 
was sufficient to trigger further review. "[A] delay may be so lengthy as to require 
a finding of presumptive prejudice, and thus trigger the analysis of the other 
factors." Pittman, 373 S.C. at 549, 647 S.E.2d at 155. 
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In State v. Evans, 386 S.C. at 424-26, 688 S.E.2d at 586-87, this court found a 
twelve-year delay in bringing a case to trial did not violate the defendant's speedy 
trial right when the defendant's statement to police was suppressed; the appeals of 
the suppression order lasted five years; after the appeals, the case was transferred 
to an assistant solicitor and the solicitor was later elected solicitor of another 
circuit; and the defendant failed to establish she was prejudiced by the delay.  In 
State v. Cooper, 386 S.C. 210, 217-18, 687 S.E.2d 62, 67 (Ct. App. 2009), this 
court held a delay of forty-four months did not violate the defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial even though the delay was to some degree the 
result of prosecutorial and governmental negligence because any presumption of 
prejudice was persuasively rebutted when the State withdrew its notice to seek the 
death penalty. Thus, the court found the withdrawal could be construed as a 
benefit to the defendant resulting from the delay.  Id.
Palmer responded to a warrant for his arrest by turning himself in to law 
enforcement on November 15, 2010.  Palmer made a timely motion for a speedy 
trial on March 24, 2011, and renewed his motion on March 26, 2012, along with a 
motion to dismiss.  Palmer was represented initially by Legrand Carraway of the 
Williamsburg County Public Defender's Office.  Carraway was relieved as counsel, 
and W. James Hoffmeyer was later appointed.  He was subsequently relieved as 
counsel, and William J. Barr was appointed on December 15, 2011.  Barr was 
relieved as counsel on August 24, 2012, and E. Guy Ballenger was appointed on 
August 16, 2012. Ballenger was Palmer's counsel at the trial on March 11-14, 
2013.
On March 5, 2013, Palmer filed a motion in limine.  In his motion, he renewed his 
motion for a speedy trial and requested that his charges be dismissed.  The motion 
was heard by the court after jury selection.  The State argued that Carraway had 
previously represented the victim on an unrelated charge, and Palmer requested 
new counsel. Palmer also requested that Hoffmeyer file a motion to be relieved as 
counsel after his bond hearing. Palmer also consented to Barr's motion to be 
relieved as counsel. Therefore, the State asserted "it's not proper for him now to 
say because I fired all of these lawyers and my court is two years after I was 
arrested I'm now somehow prejudiced based on my own conduct." 
The court denied his motion, stating:   
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Alright based upon the criteria.  It is two years out[.] I've 
seen longer and again the [sic] apparently a highly[-
]technical case[.] [W]e've got over thirty something 
witnesses named in this.  One of the reason [sic] 
obviously it appears to be at least Mr. Palmer being 
unsatisfied with his attorneys[.]  I think he's now got a 
great attorney. You've tried cases in front of me before 
and been very successful.  I understand that he has 
asserted this right at [a] point in time as he should have[,] 
but I don't find where he's [sic] could be unfairly 
prejudice[d] in this matter[,] and I'm going to deny your 
motion. 
Palmer argues on appeal that the delay was not his fault.  He asserts there is no 
evidence that any of his attorneys requested a continuance or indicated they needed 
time to prepare for the case. He argues the delay was caused by the State's failure 
to schedule the case for trial.  He also argues he was prejudiced by the delay 
because he was incarcerated from his arrest until his trial, which hindered his 
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.  
Furthermore, there was no direct physical evidence linking Palmer to the murder, 
and Smith and Croskey were inconsistent in their testimony and statements.  
Finally, he was prejudiced by the death of a witness and the lack of memory by 
another witness. 
Palmer's trial was held just shy of two years from the date of his first motion for a 
speedy trial. We find this delay was sufficient to trigger further review of his right 
to speedy trial, and he asserted his right three times.  See Waites, 270 S.C. at 108, 
240 S .E.2d at 653 (determining a two-year-and-four-month delay was sufficient to 
trigger further review). As for the reason for the delay, at the July 21, 2011 
hearing, the solicitor noted Palmer's case would not be able to be tried until Spring 
2012 because of other matters already scheduled.  An additional reason for the 
delay was due to Palmer having four attorneys prior to trial.  See State v. Kennedy, 
339 S.C. 243, 250, 528 S.E.2d 700, 704 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding no violation of 
the defendant's right to a speedy trial, even though the delay was two years and two 
months, when the case was clearly complicated and required substantial time to 
investigate and prepare and there was no evidence the State purposefully delayed 
the trial); State v. Smith, 307 S.C. 376, 380, 415 S.E.2d 409, 411 (Ct. App. 1992) 
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(holding the burden was on the defendant to show the delay was due to the neglect 
and willfulness of the State's prosecution).  As for prejudice to Palmer, he 
contended he was prejudiced because his case hinged on eyewitness testimony, and 
they may have difficulty in recalling.  Palmer was able to challenge some witness'
credibility by using their prior statements. See Brazell, 325 S.C. at 76, 480 S.E.2d 
at 70-71 (noting the three-year-and-five-month delay was negated by the lack of 
prejudice to the defense); Kennedy, 339 S.C. at 251, 528 S.E.2d at 704 ("While 
Kennedy may have been slightly prejudiced by the twenty-six month pretrial 
incarceration, the more important question is whether he was prejudiced because 
the delay impaired his defense."); Langford, 400 S.C. at 445, 735 S.E.2d at 484 
(finding a two-year delay in bringing the case to trial did not amount to a 
constitutional violation in the absence of any actual prejudice to the defendant's
case).  Furthermore, the death of the one witness was not raised at trial; therefore, 
it is not preserved. Accordingly, we find the trial court properly weighed the four 
Barker factors, and the evidence supported its decision. 
IV. Statement to Law Enforcement 
Palmer argues the trial court erred in admitting his statement to law enforcement 

after he invoked his right to counsel. We disagree. 

"A waiver of Miranda rights is determined from the totality of the circumstances."  

State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 429, 510 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998).  "On appeal, the 

conclusion of the trial [court] on issues of fact as to the voluntariness of a 

statement will not be disturbed unless so manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse 

of discretion."  Id.  "Statements elicited during interrogation are admissible if the 

prosecution can establish that the suspect 'knowingly and intelligently waived his 

privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.'"  

Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
 
At trial, Palmer moved to suppress his statement given to law enforcement on 

October 29, 2010. Officer Creech read Palmer his Miranda warnings, and Palmer 

said he would talk to the officers.  The transcript of the conversation states in 

pertinent part: 

Creech: Do you wish to talk to us? 

Palmer: I wish to talk to you, but I need for you to call Charles Barr too. 
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Creech: You want him here? 

Palmer: I want him to come, yes. 

Creech: Before you talk with us? 

Palmer: I'll talk to you.
 
Creech: That's what I'm asking. 

Palmer: Okay, w[hat d]o you want to know? 

Creech: Are you willing to talk to us? 

Palmer: Yes. 

Creech: Do you understand your rights and do you understand what your 

rights are, and you want to talk to us? You want to talk to us without a 
lawyer present? 
Palmer: Yes. 
Creech: You understand and know what you're doing, and we haven't 
promised you anything or threatened you in any[]way. 
Palmer: No.
Creech: And no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against you by 
anyone? 
Palmer: No.
Palmer then signed the waiver of rights form.  After Palmer gave his statement, he 
told Creech he was not going to say anything else, and he wanted to talk to a 
lawyer. Creech then ended the interview.  Palmer stated he wanted to talk to a 
lawyer when Creech asked him if he would take a polygraph exam.  Creech said 
Palmer was not under arrest at the time.  
Palmer testified he was told he was under arrest by Investigator Deborah Collins, 
but when he arrived at the sheriff's office, he was told he was not under arrest.  He 
testified he kept asking for Barr, and his mother told him to speak to him before he
talked to anyone. Palmer said Investigator Collins took his cell phone so he could 
not call Barr himself, and she took his driver's license so he could not leave.  He 
said he told the police he would talk to them without his lawyer present because he 
was scared and had never been through anything like it before.  He admitted he had 
been arrested three times prior for simple possession of marijuana, but he had 
never been subjected to interrogation. Palmer testified Creech told him before they 
gave him the waiver that he would not really be waiving his right.  On cross-
examination, Palmer acknowledged he understood the Miranda warnings, and he 
could have stopped talking to the officers at any time.  Palmer argued his statement 
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should be suppressed under State v. Wanamaker, 346 S.C. 495, 552 S.E.2d 284 
(2001), which reaffirms that if a suspect invokes her right to counsel, the police 
interrogation must cease unless the suspect herself initiates further communication 
with police. The court denied the motion to suppress admission of Palmer's
statement. Palmer renewed his motion when the audio recording was introduced at 
trial, and the court overruled the objection.  He again renewed the motion after the 
jury verdict. 
On appeal, Palmer argues his request for counsel was sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement was 
a request for an attorney.  Palmer asserts the officers were required to cease 
questioning unless an attorney was present. 
In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994), the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that, "after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda
rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the 
suspect clearly requests an attorney."  "Of course, when a suspect makes an 
ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the 
interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney."  Id.
Here, Palmer stated he would talk to the officers, but he also wanted his attorney.  
Because Palmer did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel, the officers 
were allowed to ask a few questions for clarification.  Palmer indicated he wanted 
to continue talking to the officers after being advised of his Miranda rights, and he 
voluntarily waived his rights before his statement was taken.  Therefore, we find 
the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress Palmer's statement. 
V. Sentencing 
Palmer argues the trial court erred in sentencing him on a possession of a weapon 
during the commission of a violent crime conviction after sentencing him to life 
imprisonment without parole for murder.  We agree. 
Palmer was found guilty of murder and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a violent crime.  The court sentenced Palmer to five years' 
imprisonment on the possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 
crime after sentencing him to life without parole on the murder.  Palmer objected 
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to the sentence. Palmer argues this was in error because S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-
490(A) (2015) provides the five-year sentence is inapplicable when a court 
imposes a life without parole sentence.  
The State concedes this was in error, and we agree.  Therefore, Palmer's sentence 
for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime should be 
vacated.  See State v. Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 666, 552 S.E.2d 745, 760 (2001), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 
(2005).
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we affirm Palmer's convictions for murder and possession of a 
weapon during the commission of a violent crime and vacate his sentence for 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. 
AFFIRMED and VACATED IN PART. 
GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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LOCKEMY, J.: Protection and Advocacy for the People with Disabilities, Inc. 
(P&A), et al. (collectively, Appellants), appeal the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment for the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs 
(DDSN), et al. (collectively, Respondents), arguing the court erred in (1) finding 
Appellants did not have standing; (2) failing to consider the fundamental purpose 
of the Declaratory Judgment Act; (3) ruling on the issue of binding norms; and (4) 
finding DDSN is not required to promulgate regulations.  We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellants filed this action on April 7, 2007.  Appellants include anonymous 
guardians/friends on behalf of eleven anonymous disabled individuals, and P&A, a 
private, nonprofit corporation established pursuant to federal and state law to 
advocate for the rights of people with disabilities. 
In their complaint, Appellants asserted DDSN, a state agency established to 
provide services to citizens with disabilities and their families, failed to promulgate 
regulations as required by sections 44-20-220, 44-20-790, and 44-26-180 of the 
South Carolina Code. Appellants sought an order requiring DDSN to "promptly 
promulgate regulations governing the operation of the department and the 
employment of professional staff and personnel, and to obtain informed consent 
and to protect the dignity of the individual in research settings."  In addition, 
Appellants asserted DDSN failed to promulgate regulations regarding "issues of 
critical concern to applicants and recipients of its services, including but not 
limited to eligibility for its services; appeal procedures; standards for the operation 
of its residential programs; procedures for its Human Rights Committees; and 
standards for research on human subjects."  Appellants complained DDSN's failure 
to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 
resulted in citizens and entities being "unable to seek information about its policies 
42 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
in the South Carolina Administrative Code, unable to determine their rights or 
receive or dispute []DDSN decisions, and [unable to] participate in the rule making 
process . . . ." Appellants asserted they have been and will continue to be harmed 
as a result of DDSN's deficiencies, "through denial of services, inadequate services 
and unequal availability and quality of services, and lack of an appropriate 
grievance procedure." Appellants further complained about decisions in individual 
cases, such as claims that an individual was not eligible for autism services and an 
individual was not waitlisted for residential placement.  Appellants did not ask the 
court to order any affirmative relief in any of their cases, other than requiring 
DDSN to promulgate regulations.   
Appellants also filed a petition to allow the named plaintiffs in the action to 
proceed anonymously.  The circuit court granted the motion, stating "identification 
of the individually named Plaintiffs potentially poses a risk of retaliatory denial of 
needed services which may result in physical or mental harm to the individually 
named Plaintiffs."  According to Appellants, each of the named individual 
Appellants presented affidavits to the circuit court, which were subsequently sealed 
by the court. 
Thereafter, on May 31, 2007, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss and a motion 
for a more definite statement.  The circuit court denied both motions.  Respondents 
subsequently filed an answer, denying for lack of information the specific facts 
regarding each of the anonymous individual Appellants.  As an affirmative 
defense, Respondents challenged the standing of all of the Appellants.  
Respondents also denied DDSN had a duty to promulgate regulations.   
Thereafter, both parties filed summary judgment motions.  In September 2013, the 
circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondents and denied Appellants'
motion.  In granting Respondents' motion, the circuit court held there was "no 
evidence whatsoever before the [c]ourt as to the facts concerning the individual 
[Appellants]," and as a result, no evidence was presented of actual injury to any of 
Appellants and they lacked standing. The court also found Appellants' claims in 
this case, unlike the claims in public importance standing cases, require a case-by-
case factual showing as to how specific plaintiffs are, or are not, affected by the 
absence of regulations in specific situations.  The court further noted that while 
Appellants relied heavily on the Declaratory Judgment Act in their argument, 
parties seeking declaratory relief still must demonstrate a justiciable controversy.  
The circuit court held that even assuming Appellants had standing, their claims
lacked substantive merit.  The court found no statute required the promulgation of 
regulations in the subject areas of the lawsuit.  The court 
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Appellants' argument that DDSN had improperly established binding norms
because it was not pled in the complaint.  
Appellants subsequently filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to reconsider.  The 
circuit court denied the motion but modified its order to clarify that Appellants 
would not be precluded from raising issues related to binding norms in subsequent 
administrative appeals.  This appeal followed.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court 
applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, 
which provides summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 
(2002). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 
S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003). "Once the moving party carries its initial burden, the 
opposing party must come forward with specific facts that show there is a genuine 
issue of fact remaining for trial." Sides v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 362 S.C. 250, 
255, 607 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Ct. App. 2004). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Standing 
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in finding they did not have standing.  We 
agree. 
"To have standing, one must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the 
lawsuit." Sloan v. Greenville Cty., 356 S.C. 531, 547, 590 S.E.2d 338, 347 (Ct. 
App. 2003). Here, Appellants contend they have standing to pursue their claims
related to the promulgation of regulations by DDSN pursuant to statute, through 
the rubric of constitutional standing, and under the public importance exception.  
See ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cty., 380 S.C. 191, 195, 669 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2008) 
("Standing may be acquired: (1) by statute; (2) through the rubric of 'constitutional 
standing'; or (3) under the 'public importance' exception."). 
A. P&A 
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Pursuant to section 43-33-350 of the South Carolina Code, P&A  
shall protect and advocate for the rights of all 
developmentally disabled persons, including the 
requirements of Section 113 of Public Law 94-103, 
Section 105 of Public Law 99-319, and Section 112 of 
Public Law 98-221, all as amended, and for the rights of 
other handicapped persons by pursuing legal, 
administrative, and other appropriate remedies to insure 
the protection of the rights of these persons. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-350(1) (2015).   
P&A asserts it has been injured by DDSN's failure to promulgate regulations "in 
that it has and will continue to repeatedly expend time and resources attempting to 
determine and enforce rights of developmentally disabled persons without access 
to any meaningful or enforceable rules or regulations regarding eligibility and 
services, and with no access to judicial review of decisions affecting its clients."  
Gloria Prevost, Executive Director of P&A, stated in her affidavit the impact and 
effect the lack of properly promulgated regulations has on P&A and the citizens it 
is statutorily obligated and mandated to protect.  According to Prevost, the lack of 
regulations harms the population DDSN is mandated to serve through (1) the 
denial of services for arbitrary and capricious reasons; (2) inadequate services and 
unequal availability and quality of services; and (3) a lack of an appropriate and 
defined grievance procedure.  Due to the lack of regulations promulgated by 
DDSN, Prevost contends applicants for and recipients of services do not have 
officially published information about many aspects of DDSN services, including 
(1) eligibility; (2) appeal procedures; (3) standards for the operation of the 
residential facilities operated by DDSN; (4) procedures and standards for human 
rights committees; (5) standards for research on human subjects, including how 
consent is obtained for research to be performed; and (5) budget cut decisions and 
procedures. Prevost asserts P&A must expend resources and time in attempting to 
find and analyze the directives and standards DDSN has issued as a substitution for 
promulgating regulations.   
We hold the circuit court erred in finding P&A lacked standing.  We find P&A has 
standing under section 43-33-350 and its directive that P&A is entitled to pursue 
remedies to insure the protection of the rights of disabled persons.  Further, we find 
P&A has sufficiently asserted injuries it has suffered as a result of DDSN's alleged 
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failure to promulgate regulations.  See Carolina All. for Fair Emp't v. S.C. Dep't of 
Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 337 S.C. 476, 487, 523 S.E.2d 795, 800 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("An organization has standing only if it alleges that it or its members will 
suffer an individualized injury; a mere interest in a problem is not enough.").  
B. Individual Appellants 
Like P&A, the individual Appellants are seeking the promulgation of regulations 
by DDSN. They are not seeking individual relief for specific alleged harms.  As 
discussed above, P&A is authorized by statute to pursue legal, administrative, and 
other appropriate remedies to insure the protection of the rights of disabled 
persons. Thus, we find P&A is the appropriate party to pursue claims for the 
promulgation of regulations by DDSN.  Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did 
not err in finding the individual Appellants lacked standing. 
II. Promulgation of Regulations 
In light of our reversal of the circuit court as to the standing of P&A, we vacate the 
portion of the circuit court's order concerning the merits of Appellants' appeal, 
including its findings as to the issue of binding norms.  We hold the circuit court's 
findings in regards to the merits of P&A's appeal were not sufficiently detailed as 
to the specific claims raised.  We remand to the circuit court for litigation of the 
issues regarding the requirements of the specific statutes concerning the 
promulgation of regulations by DDSN.   
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.     
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